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Agricultural  trade in the  1980s became the  focal point of the world
trading community.  Much of the  focus has been on the problems and
prospects for  trade reform in the eighth round of global  trade
negotiations, the Uruguay Round.  The Uruguay Round of multilateral  trade
negotiations  (MTN) began at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in December 1986.
After failure to address problems of agriculture  in previous negotiations,
held periodically under the General Agreement on Tariffs  and Trade since
1947,  the contracting parties to  the GATT resolved in 1986 that  the
situation in world markets demanded that trade previously largely exempted
from GATT rules should be subjected to  greater discipline.  A key area was
trade  in agriculture.
Although the Uruguay Round included fifteen separate negotiating  areas
in all,  the agricultural negotiations proved central to  the interests  of
both the rich countries  of the North, where agriculture  is heavily
subsidized, and the poor countries of the South, where  it  is  the principal
source of export earnings  and economic growth.  After four years of
negotiations, the outcome  of the Uruguay Round remains  in doubt, although
there is  reason to believe that some progress in agriculture will be made.
The subject of this chapter  is  the role and interests of the
developing countries  in the process of agricultural trade policy reform
under GATT.  It begins with an analysis of the multilateral  trading system
during the  1980s  and the conditions  leading up to the 1986 Punta del Este
meeting.  It then briefly details  the discussions over agriculture that
have occurred during the Uruguay Round, describing the alignment of
interests  and key negotiating issues.  The discussion then focuses more
1directly on the special  interests of the developing countries,  and some of
the  differences in these  interests in various parts of  the developing
world.  Several efforts to  quantify the benefits  that would result from
agricultural trade reform are reported, indicating the magnitude and the
differences  in these benefits for countries and regions.  The  elements of a
possible compromise  in GATT are proposed, together with a description of
its key features  from the point of view of developing countries.  The
chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the factors that will affect
trade reform in the  1990s,  and a summary of the main findings.
2.  The Erosion of the Multilateral Trading System in the  1980s
Post-war international economic relations  in agriculture may be
divided into  three broad periods.  In the  1950s  and 1960s,  agricultural
development occurred in many parts  of the world, driven especially by
technological innovations.  This  set the stage for the  1970s, when
agricultural production and trade  grew rapidly.  This  growth was  fueled by
substantial  increases in debt in many developing countries.  In part due to
the burdents  of accumulated debt, the gap between rich and poor countries'
growth widened.  In the early 1980s,  mounting debt and economic recession
reduced the demand for traded agricultural commodities, yet national
policies, especially in the North, continued to encourage excess
production, leading to  surplus disposal and falling prices in world
markets.  These trends affected different countries differently, making
broad generalizations subject to numerous  exceptions.
Yet by the mid-1980s a consensus had emerged that world agriculture
was  in disarray, and that the crisis was significantly related to policies
which sought  to protect farmers  in the North from global competition, while
2restricting access by poor farmers in the South to  lucrative  trading
opportunities.1 This consensus was resisted by some of the most important
players  in the multilateral  trading system, notably the European Community
(E.C.) whose Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was blamed for a large
measure of global agricultural disequilibrium.2 In the United States,  a
policy of more open trade was pursued selectively, with protectionism
continuing in critical areas of agriculture  such as  sugar, dairy and
peanuts,  as well as  in textiles.
Despite these notable exceptions, the U.S.  and developing countries
found common cause  in the  1980s  over general liberalization  of agricultural
trade,  especially in the  grains and oilseeds.  The  reasons  for this  are
relatively straightforward:  it  is  in these sectors that the  U.S.  (as well
as  other net exporters such as  Canada, Australia, Brazil and Argentina)
enjoy their greatest comparative advantages, and the developing countries
as  a whole are their most important future markets.  Far  less  clear was
whether  the U.S.,  E.C. and Japan were prepared to  increase  levels  of market
access  to developing countries in their most heavily protected sectors,
where they enjoyed far fewer advantages.  This  issue remained particularly
difficult for the  E.C.,  whose own production advantages,  even in  the grains
and oilseeds, were substantially less  in most areas  than in the U.S. and
other net exporting regions.
Table 1 shows  trends  in economic growth, food production and food
imports and exports from 1965-1986, based on data assembled by the U.S.
1K. Anderson and Y. Hayami.  The Political  Economy of Agricultural
Protectionism.  London:  Allen and Unwin.  1986.
2See Harald von Witzke, C. Ford Runge and Brian Job,  (eds.), Policy
Coordination in World Agriculture.  Kiel:  Wissenschaftsverlag Vauk, 1989.
3Congressional Budget Office from World Bank and FAO sources.3 After
increases in developing country GDP growth per capita of  3.9 percent  from
1965-80, this growth fell by  -0.5 percent from 1980-85.  The worst declines
were in the Middle East and Africa, followed by Latin America.  In Asia,
growth continued to  increase by 3.1  percent from 1980-85,  slowing  in the
U.S.  and Canada from 2.0 percent from 1965-80 to  1.5  percent from 1980-85.
In Western Europe,  the decline was  from 3.0 percent from 1960-80 to  1.2
percent from 1980-85.  Growth in food production slowed by half in
developing countries  (excluding China) from 1975-81 to  1981-86, or from 0.6
to  0.3 percent, although total calories  supplied increased marginally.
As  per capita GDP  fell, so did the demand for developed countries'
exports.  Developing country  food imports, a key variable explaining world
trade frictions, plummeted from a growth rate of 9.4 percent from 1975-81
to  0.9 percent from 1981-86, while growth  in developing country food
exports also  fell,  from 6.2 percent  in 1975-81  to 0.7 percent in 1981-86.
In the North, the agricultural export growth rates of  the United States  and
Canada reflected those import declines,  falling from a positive rate of 7.8
percent  from 1975-81 to  a negative 7.3 percent from 1981-86.  In partial
contrast, the continuing disposal of E.C.  surpluses in world markets  led
Western Europe's  export growth to decline only from 6.9 percent to 4.8
percent over  the same period.
These data reveal the broad outlines of trends leading to  the
negotiating table in GATT:  falling per capita incomes  and falling food
imports  in developing countries;  declining overall growth in the economies
3Congress  of the United States,  Congressional Budget Office.
Agricultural  Progress in the Third World and its  Effect on U.S. Farm
Exports, May, 1989,  p. 20.
4Table  1.  FOOD PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, AND TRADE GROWTH RATES  (Average annual growth
rates  in percent  and calories)
Food  Calories
GDP  Production  Supplied
per  per  per  Food  Food
Capita  Capita  Capitab  Imports  Exports
1965-  1980-  1975-  1981-  1969-  1983  1975-  1981-  1975-  1981-
Regiona  1980  1985  1981  1986  1971  1985  1981  1986  1981  1986
Developing
(Less China)  3.9  -0.5  0.6  0.3  2,173  2,364  9.4  0.9  6.2  0.7
(With China)  3.9  1.0  0.9  1.4  2,113  2,424  10.3  0.0  5.2  2.2
Selected Countries
Latin America  4.0  -1.9  1.0  -0.5  2,517  2,700  11.9  -4.5  6.4  -0.9
Asia  3.9  3.1  1.1  1.0  2,059  2,239  2.3  3.0  7.7  5.3
Middle East  3.9  -3.4  0.4  -0.1  2,397  2,957  14.4  2.5  14.4  -0.5
Africa  3.6  -2.2  -1.8  -0.1  2,103  2,129  10.4  1.6  -1.9  -0.4
Centrally Planned
China  4.2  8.6  1.8  4.4  1,974  2,564  16.5  -5.8  -2.8  15.6
USSR/Eastern
Europe  n.a.  n.a.  -0.5  2.9  3,332  3,410  11.5  -7.5  0.0  -0.2
Developed  2.8  1.7  1.4  0.1  3,231  3,356  2.0  1.6  7.5  -1.6
United States/
Canada  2.0  1.5  1.9  -0.9  3,456  3,632  3.8  3.2  7.8  -7.3
Western Europe  3.0  1.2  1.3  1.2  3,261  3,379  1.2  1.0  6.9  4.8
World  n.a.  n.a.  0.6  0.8  2,449  2,666  6.3  -0.4  6.4  -0.6
SOURCES:  Congressional Budget Office, from Food and Agriculture Organization of  the
United Nations,  FAO Production Yearbook 1986 and FAO Trade Yearbook 1986;
World Bank, World Development Report 1987.
NOTE:  n.a. - not available.
aRegional  definitions follow standard FAO groupings.  China includes other Asian
centrally planned economies.  Asia excludes China, other Asian centrally planned
economies, and Japan, as well as Middle Eastern Asian countries.  The Middle East
includes  Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, and excludes  Israel.  Africa excludes South Africa,
Egypt, Libya, and Sudan.  Developed countries include South Africa and Israel.  FAO and
World Bank country group  definitions can differ slightly.
bCalories supplied is  a proxy for per capita consumption.  It equals  domestic  food
production plus food imports minus food exports, with a correction for livestock feed
use.  Calories  supplied per capita represents  the quantity of food reaching households,
all of which may not be consumed because of various losses of edible food and nutrients
in the household.
5of developed countries;  and declining agricultural exports  from North
America, especially relative  to  the European Community.  These  trends  were
manifest  in increasing trade frictions which seemed to  require multilateral
solutions.
The deterioration of the multilateral trading system in the  1980s  can
also be demonstrated by a variety of measures of protection, to which many
countries resorted as markets shrank.  Tyers and Anderson calculated
individual commodity price  series for each major country  to determine
nominal rates of protection  (the percentage by which producer prices  in
agriculture plus marketing margins exceeded border prices).  They estimated
that the average nominal  rate of protection for grain, livestock and sugar
was  21 percent in 1965-74.  By 1975-83,  the figure was  28  percent, or one
quarter higher.  These increases were concentrated in the E.C.-10  (an
increase from 38  to 51 percent from 1965-74 to  1975-83),  the European Free
Trade Area (EFTA)  (an increase  from 62  to  89  percent) and in Japan (from
110  to 160 percent).4
The consequences of increased protection levels during the  1980s were
demonstrable.  Because countries  in the North insulated their  farmers  from
global market conditions, maintaining high  internal prices relative to
world prices,  they tended to overproduce.  When overproduction was dumped
into world markets at subsidy, as under the export subsidies of  the  E.C.
(and the retaliatory response of the U.S.,  the Export Enhancement Program
[EEP])  the result was  to destabilize and lower prices further.  As  demand
weakened in developing countries due to  the burdens of accumulated debts,
4R. Tyers  and K. Anderson, "Liberalizing OECD Agricultural Policies  in
the Uruguay Round:  Effects on Trade and Welfare."  Journal of Agricultural
Economics  39(May,  1988),  pp.  201-202.
6world market prices went even lower, which further exacerbated the  debt-
repayment ability of countries,  such as Argentina and Brazil, primarily
dependent on agricultural exports  for foreign exchange.
Loans made  to developing countries in the  1970s  and early 1980s  were
predicated on expectations of continuing inflation, allowing dollar-
denominated liabilities  to  depreciate in real value.  When the opposite
occurred due to  the deflationary policies of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank
and a rise in the value of the  dollar from 1979-85,  the  loans  increased in
real value,  as  did the  real interest  levels necessary to finance them.
Developing countries' combined debt in  1987  totaled over  $950 billion, of
which $380 billion was concentrated in Latin America.5 While middle-income
oil producing countries accounted for a substantial portion of the total,
over two-thirds  of the debt  in 1984 was held by major importers of
agricultural  commodities.  Most of these  countries held more than 40
percent of their debt  in  short-term and private  loans highly subject to
interest rate swings.
After  the boom-lending years  of the  1970s,  credit tightened in the
1980s, and a major source of finance  for expanded agricultural  imports
dissipated.  By the mid-1980s, hard currency earnings in developing
countries were going primarily to  service existing debt, making aggressive
sales of agricultural products, often at below the cost of production, one
of the only means of financial survival.  Per capita incomes suffered
accordingly, falling as much as  50 percent in some debt-ridden developing
countries in the  two years from 1981-83.  In those countries where
5General Accounting Office,  Factors Influencing Trends  in World
Agricultural  Production and Trade, January, 1989.  GAO/RCED-89-1.
7agricultural export  expansion has been possible, notably in Asia,  the
impacts of debt  service were softened, but world market conditions
continued to  suffer.
This vicious circle,  in addition to reducing the terms of  trade  for
many developing countries, also raised the costs of export subsidies  in the
U.S.  and European Community.  It was  the  internal cost of these subsidies
in the North  (which  reached $26  billion in the U.S.  in 1987)  that
ultimately led the U.S.  and the  E.C.  to agree  to initiate negotiations at
Punta del Este  in December, 1986.  After a near deadlock over agriculture,
the E.C.  agreed at Punta to  open talks under the auspices of  the GATT to
last four years,  concluding in December 1990.
3.  The Uruguay Round of GATT and the  Developing Countries'  Interests
Agriculture  thus emerged as  a key issue  in the political economy of
international trade in the  1980s  largely in the context of the Uruguay
Round of the GATT. 6 Because agricultural trade disputes cannot be divorced
from domestic farm programs, many foreign trade officials and others  in the
diplomatic community were forced in the  1980s  to confront complex issues  of
agricultural policy for  the first time.  As  then Italian foreign minister
Giuilo Andreotti lamented during a 1988 debate over European Community
agricultural spending, "I sit there talking about soybeans, and I don't
even know what the miserable things look like."
In developing countries, of course, agriculture remained the central
mode  of production.  But the problems of Third World agricultural
development alone would have been insufficient to bring agriculture  to  the
6This  section draws on Carlisle Ford Runge, "The Assault on
Agricultural Protectionism."  Foreign Affairs  (Fall, 1988):  133-50.
8center of the multilateral trade negotiations.
During the  1970s, when the  costs of farm programs were  low and foreign
markets for surpluses were growing, attention to agricultural  trade
distortions lagged in capitols and international economic fora  in the
North.  But in the mid-1980s, budget costs,  shrinking foreign demand, and
unsold surpluses threatened a global agricultural  trade war.  The result
was increasing international attention to the problems of agriculture.
Prior to  the  Uruguay Round, largely at  the insistence of the United
States,  the European Community, and Japan, agriculture was treated under
GATT as  a special  case, immune  from the principles of trade  liberalization
that have otherwise guided the General Agreement.  So special was  the  case
of agriculture  that it  largely escaped the  discipline of the basic
principles on which the GATT is  founded.  These are  (1) nondiscrimination
and reciprocity in trade;  (2) protection through measures that are
"transparent,"  in the  sense  that they can be easily measured and monitored;
(3) the establishment of "bound" levels of protection through negotiation;
and (4) notification, consultation and arbitration in the even of disputes.
Despite attempts  to bring agriculture under GATT rules  in the Kennedy
Round (1963-67) and the Tokyo Round (1973-79) of negotiations,  it would not
be an exaggeration to say that since World War II,  trade  in agriculture
became more discriminatory,  less  transparent, less bound, and less subject
to multilateral consultation and negotiation.  Although  the basic
principles of nondiscrimination and reciprocity expressed in Articles  I and
II of the GATT were  intended to apply  to agricultural  and nonagricultural
trade alike,  agriculture largely escaped from the prohibitions against
quantitative import and export restrictions under Article XI, and against
9export subsidies under Article XVI.  In addition to  general exceptions
granted to agriculture under these GATT articles,  the United States
demanded and received special treatment under a 1955 waiver that allows
quantitative import restrictions on products affected by domestic price
supports.  Without this waiver, it would be impossible  to  reconcile United
States obligations to nondiscrimination with domestic agricultural support
measures that require  import fees and quotas for commodities such as  sugar.
Before  the Dillion Round  (1960-61) of negotiations, support  for
formation of the CAP, largely on national security grounds, made it seem
advisable to grant Europe the right to  replace national tariffs with common
border measures,  including variable levies on imports  to help shore up
domestic prices in what was  then a large net importing region of  the world.
With continued economic expansion and increasingly generous farm subsidies,
however, Europe emerged in the 1970s  as an agricultural exporter, and
export subsidies were used to dispose of  its mounting surpluses, reducing
U.S. exporters'  share of world markets.
In addition to  the barriers  to market access developed by the U.S.  and
E.C.,  Japan also evolved a complex set of customs duties,  import quotas,
and other border measures, combined with direct government payments  to
producers and a wide array of other domestic subsidies, designed especially
to protect its most politically sensitive commodity:  rice.
Together, the agricultural protectionism of the U.S.,  E.C. and Japan
put each of these major capitalist economies  in the difficult position of
seeking  to enlarge  the scope and level of world trade, while continually
pleading that their agricultural producers could not sustain greater trade
liberalization.  Even the  few agricultural measures that were bound under
10GATT, such as  the guaranteed access of soybeans  and corn gluten feed
shipments to  Europe  (the  "zero duty binding"),  were under steady attack by
E.C.  interests seeking additional barriers to  access.  The consultation and
dispute  settlement process  in GATT was  too weak to  successfully solve many
trade disputes,  leading parties  to  revert to bilateral retaliation when not
satisfied with the system of GATT panels established for the purpose.  The
most notable examples of these bilateral disputes  in recent years have been
in agriculture.
As battles  over agricultural  trade barriers  raged in the North, the
conditions  of agriculture in the South slowly deteriorated, partly because
of reduced global  trading opportunities,  and partly due to  domestic
policies that penalized farmers by lowering the effective  price of food in
response  to political pressures  in urban areas.
The  role of the South  in GATT was problematic.  What had begun in 1947
as  a 22  country  "rich man's  club" encompassed 108 negotiating parties by
1990, the bulk of which were developing countries.  Yet  the interests and
concerns  of developing countries  in GATT differed widely, and their
resources were stretched to  the limit as they tried to stay abreast of
complex and interlinked negotiating areas.  In part  in response to  the
perceived needs of developing countries,  the Tokyo Round of GATT talks had
created important provisions under GATT that provided for  "special and
differential treatment" for developing countries, allowing them to  seek
remedies  for balance of payments difficulties and safeguards  to protect
programs of economic development.  A variety of separate  "codes" were also
11amended to the GATT articles, pertaining to subsidies and countervailing
measures and other issues  involving nontariff barriers to  trade.7 On the
whole, however, the developing countries have had difficulty achieving
their objectives  in GATT.  Given the  increasing number of contracting
parties,  the heterogeneity of countries'  interests makes it  difficult for a
well-defined developing country agenda to emerge,  and the relative
influence of the rich OECD countries continues  to  loom large.8
Even so,  the Uruguay Round was launched with a focus on agriculture in
part because of  the  strong interests of  the developing countries  in gaining
market access  to  the North.  Despite a variety of  special trade concessions
granting access, such as the  E.C.'s Lome Convention, in reality many
competitively priced  imports from the South were locked out of Northern
markets by tariff and nontariff barriers.  In addition to market access,
some developing countries also  stood to gain from reductions  in the export
subsidy wars conducted between the E.C. and U.S. especially in the grains.
This  interest led to  a coalition of countries,  the so-called Cairns Group,
composed of agricultural exporters with both developed and developing
country members.9 The Cairns Group provided critical support  for
7See Bela Balassa, "The Tokyo Round and the Developing Countries,"
World Bank Staff Working Paper No.  370,  February, 1980;  and Ria Kemper,
"The Tokyo Round:  Results  and Implications for Developing Countries,"
World Bank Staff Working Paper No.  372,  February, 1980.
8See C. Ford Runge, "International Public Goods, Export Subsidies and
the Harmonization of Environmental Regulations."  Staff paper P90-77,
Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy, Department of
Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, St. Paul,
U.S.A.,  December 1990.
9The Cairns  Group includes Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Columbia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Thailand, and Uruguay.
12liberalizing agricultural trade respecting both export subsidies and market
access issues  throughout the Uruguay Round.  Both the Cairns Group and U.S.
took aim in particular at reducing the distortions caused by export
subsidies paid under E.C.'s Common Agricultural Policy.
The negotiating positions of  the parties  in  the Uruguay Round evolved
and changed over the period 1986-91, but until early 1991,  little
compromise was achieved, especially between the principal antagonists:  the
U.S. and E.G..  This North/North division was  the primary schism in the
four year negotiation.  The  second was a North/South division which was
partially overcome through  the negotiating efforts of the Cairns Group.  A
third, South/South division was  also apparent throughout, reflecting  the
diversity of developing country  interests.
The North/North division arose from the  opposed positions of the  U.S.
and E.C.  These positions created the  illusion of a "zero-sum-game,"  in
which the gain of the E.G. was  the  loss  of the U.S.,  and vice versa. 10 An
important reason for  this view lay in the faulty premises  under which both
the U.S.  and E.C.  conducted much of the Uruguay Round.
The premises which fostered the  illusion that the US and E.C.  were
locked in a zero-sum-game were largely the creations of domestic politics
on both  sides of the Atlantic.  In the U.S.  the premise was  that world
10C. Ford Runge,  "Illusion and Reality in International Agricultural
Trade Negotiations,"  a paper presented to a conference on "The World Field Crops Economy:  Scope and Limits of Liberalization of Agricultural
Policies,"  Paris, France, December 4, 1990.  Reprinted as Department of Agricultural  and Applied Economics  Staff Paper P90-67, University of
Minnesota.
13trade in agriculture must eventually be free and that to  demand anything
less  than the total elimination of all  trade-distorting policies would be
to  surrender the high ground of the negotiation.  This  premise caused the
U.S.  to  insist until past the midpoint of the round that unless
"elimination" entered the language of agreement in agriculture, there would
not be one.
After the December, 1988 mid-term review meeting  in Montreal broke up
over  the "elimination"  issue,  an agreement to pursue "substantial
progressive reductions"  in agricultural support was reached  in April,  1989
in Geneva.  Prime ministers meeting at  the Houston Summit in July, 1990,
reaffirmed a more flexible framework for negotiation built around the "de
Zeeuw text."  This  framework, authored by the then-chairman of the
Negotiating Group on Agriculture, appeared in late June, 1990.  The  text
outlined a possible agreement to  reform market access through
"tariffication" of nontariff barriers,  the reduction of export subsidies
and the restraint of domestic support.  The  de  Zeeuw text  incorporated the
idea that agricultural supports could be categorized into "red light,"
"green light"  and "yellow light" policies, with differential schedules  for
change  over time, and provided for interpretations of what must and must
not be eliminated and over what period of  time.
By October, 1990, the U.S. had stepped back from "elimination,"
calling instead for 90 percent reductions  in border measures such as  export
subsidies and 75 percent reductions in domestic agricultural supports.
While clearly intended to  signal a willingness to  negotiate, by this point
little time remained before the  final scheduled meeting in December, 1990,
to  fully explore how such reductions might be achieved.
14In contrast to  the U.S.,  European negotiating strategy was premised
until very recently on the conviction that the Common Agricultural  Policy
was  the centerpiece of community, and to weaken it would be to  tear at the
fabric of both the solidarity of the Community and the rural  culture of
Europe.  This premise was questionable, in at  least three ways.  First, the
increasing economic and social integration of Europe appeared to be
progressing rapidly, with or without the  CAP.  In part, this  was a result
of monetary union and the provisions of the Single European Act. 11 This
integration and harmonization, especially in terms  of monetary union,  did
not depend on the CAP  for its energy or inertia.  Indeed, the CAP kept many
farm assets  and much capital from migrating to  its highest and best uses in
various parts of the  Community by capitalizing its benefits  into land and
asset values  in situ,  discouraging off-farm migration of labor,  and
institutionalizing exchange rate adjustments for community price policies.
Second, the CAP proved to be a far greater source of community
discord that solidarity, especially in the  1980s.  Its budgetary demands on
scarce  E.C. resources are well known.  The very fact that the agriculture
ministers could seldom agree amongst themselves on price policies or GATT
positions suggested that the  CAP stood in the way of many gains  from both
internal and external trade reforms.  These obstacles were particularly
apparent in connection with exchange rates, and the tension between a
European Monetary System, on the  one hand, and the monetary compensatory
amounts  (MCA's) used to  adjust CAP prices for exchange rates on the other.
As  the Community became more integrated, the CAP declined in importance.
11See Michael Calingaert,  "The 1992 Challenge  from Europe:
Development of the European Community's  Internal Market," National  Planning
Association No.  237, Washington, D.C.  1988.
15Third, the role of the CAP  in preserving traditional  rural culture
was highly debatable.  Large European farmers representing 20 percent of
the total reaped 80 percent of the benefits of the  CAP.  The  inequity of
benefits distribution was also apparent between the countries  of the
Community, where the poorest countries were not always the main
beneficiaries of the CAP.12
In part because of the unwillingness of  the E.C.  to concede  the need
for CAP reform, the Brussels ministerial meeting in December, 1990, was
unable to bridge  the North/North division.  Late  in the week-long
negotiating session, however, a compromise proposal  emerged authored by the
new chairman of  the Agriculture Negotiating Group,  Swedish Agriculture
Minister Mats Hellstrom.  The  compromise was based on 30  percent reductions
in three areas:  export subsidies, market access, and internal measures of
support.  When the E.C.,  joined by South Korea and Japan, rejected the
compromise, the negotiation was adjourned, leaving not only agriculture but
14 other negotiating areas  in limbo.
In January, 1991, the  E.C. Commission brought forward in Brussels  a
new internal reform package based on reduced payments to  large producers,
with benefits  targeted to  smaller farmers,  environmental improvements  in
disadvantaged areas, and progressive reductions  in internal support.  It is
doubtful  that the new proposal  (which has not led to agreement in the EC-12
over either market access or export subsidy changes) can retrieve  the GATT
talks before  the March 1 deadline set by the U.S.  Congress in the  form of
12Ulrich Koester, "The Redistributional Effects  of the Common
Agricultural Policy, European Review of Agricultural Economics 4(1977):
321-345.  See also, Alan Buckwell,  et al.,  The Costs of the Common
Agricultural Policy, London, Croom-Helm, 1982.
16"fast track negotiating authority."13 If this deadline  is  extended,
however, there remains a possibility that a compromise will emerge during
1991-92  similar to that proposed by Hellstrom.  The elements of such an
agreement are discussed in Section 5 below.
The  second division characterizing  the Uruguay Round was a North/South
one.  As noted above, the primary issues  (within agriculture) were market
access and, for developing countries  that were net exporters, export
subsidies.  Because developing countries were being asked to accept terms
in other areas of the Uruguay Round that were politically and economically
difficult (e.g.,  textiles, services,  intellectual property) they  felt
strongly as a group  that major market access gains were needed in
agriculture as compensation.  Brazil's  statement to the GATT contracting
parties  in 1989 was  typical,14 emphasizing that development assistance
13 "Fast-track" authority for trade agreements dates to  1974.  U.S.  law
provides that,  if the procedural requirements of the statute are met,  the
Congress will give  "fast-track"  treatment to legislation proposed by  the
President, which implements multilateral or bilateral trade  agreements.
The  two key elements  are:  (1) time-limited consideration in Congress of
the President's implementing legislation;  and (2)  no amendments permitted
to  the legislation.  With the fast-track authority in place, once the
President submits legislation implementing a trade agreement, to reject a
portion of the legislation, one must vote against the entire package.
Current law gives the President fast-track authority for trade
agreements through March 1, 1991 only.  Congressionally-mandated private
sector advisory committees must submit formal reports outlining  their views
on the agreements.  A two-year extension of the  fast-track authority is
possible  if the President so requests by March 1, 1991.  The statute  also
provides a procedure, itself on the  "fast-track,"  for one house of  congress
to  disapprove the extension request between March 1 and June 1, 1991.  The
President must also consult with  the private sector advisors  in order to
show sufficient progress  to warrant an extension.
14"Special and Differential Treatment:  Brazilian Statement,"  General
Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, Switzerland, 1989.
17measures should not be considered eligible for reduction under a more
general program of trade reforms.  Special and differential treatment for
developing countries should include extended periods  to  implement reforms,
together with fewer cuts  in tariffs  and non-tariff measures and
quantitative restrictions.  Higher internal  supports should be  tolerated
than in developed countries,  and special attention should be paid to
discrimination faced by developing countries in the area of sanitary and
phytosanitary measures.l5
Yet between the developing countries, a variety of differences also
existed, creating South/South fissures  that made  it  difficult for  them to
negotiate as  a bloc.  Evidence of these differences emerged relatively
early in the Round, when a Food Importing Group  (FIGs) was formed in GATT
to  differentiate the needs  of these countries from the main agricultural
exporting countries, most of whom had joined the Cairns Group.  In a
proposal spelling out  the position of the net-importers,  the FIGs
countries called on the other contracting parties  in GATT to  "alleviate the
burden of increased prices on the import bill and balance of payments
situation of net food importing developing countries,"  and to  "enhance the
capacity of these countries  to  increase agricultural production."1 6
15See C. Ford Runge, "Trade Protectionism and Environmental
Regulations:  The New Nontariff Barriers,"  Northwestern Journal of
International Law and Business, Northwestern University School of Law,
11(1),  Fall  1990.
16 "Ways to Take Account of the Negative effects of the Agriculture
Reform Process on Net Food Importing Developing Countries by Group W/74,"
in conjunction with MTN.  GNG/NG5/W/74.  Submitted to  the Negotiating Group
on Agriculture, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva,
Switzerland, October 25,  1989.
18Specifically, the proposal cited a variety of studies showing major losses
to  food importers from trade policy reform due to  increased prices  (these
estimates are discussed in section 4).  Given such losses,  the  FIGs argued
for compensation in the form of concessional food sales,  export credits and
grants,  improved market access, increased food aid, and reduced levels  of
debt servicing.
The main South/South difference  in GATT occurred in large part between
food importers and food exporters.  This  issue was linked in turn  to  debt
servicing questions.  Lower world commodities prices due to  export subsidy
competition between the U.S.  and E.C. were a primary reason for  debt-
servicing problems  in net exporting countries such as Argentina  and Brazil,
but the  situation of the net importing countries was opposite.  Because
alleviation of export subsidies and  internal reforms  in the North were
expected to  raise world prices, the food bill of net importers would
increase, making debt service even more difficult.  As  the  FIGs statements
argued:
The rise  in import prices  of food will exacerbate the debt
servicing problems of net food importing developing countries and
therefore we propose  that international financial organizations
should take the  increase in import prices of  food fully into
account in negotiating structural adjustment programs;
specifically these programs  should be made more  flexible.17
The overall interest of developing countries in GATT thus had two main
axes:  North/South and South/South.  From a North/South perspective,
17Ibid.,  p. 3.
19developing countries have argued in GATT for increased market access  to  the
industrialized countries, whether they were net food importers or
exporters.  But along the  South/South axis,  the critical  issue  of debt
servicing divided those countries  that would gain from rising international
commodities prices  (net exporters)  from those  that would lose  (net
importers).  This South/South division turned critically on the estimated
impacts  of the trade reform process on prices and net welfare.  It  is  to
these estimates  to which we now turn.
4.  The Evidence of Benefits from Trade Reform
Numerous  academic and government studies have estimated the  size and
distribution of benefits that would result from agricultural trade  reform.
These estimates  confront the many problems of econometric modelling, and
should be interpreted with caution.1 8 Tyers, one of  the principal
1 8 The leading studies cited by the  FIGs group as  of 1989 were
(a)  OECD, National Policies and Agricultural Trade, Paris, May 1987.  This
study presents several scenarios.  The scenario selected here assumes
a 10 percent across-the-board reduction in support from 1979-81
levels:  the  results have been multiplied by 10  to  yield approximate
price changes consistent with the  "full  liberalization" assumptions  of
the other studies reported here.
(b)  Vernon O. Roningen, Dixit, P. M.  and Seeley, R.,  Agricultural Outlook
for the Year 2000:  Some Alternatives, mimeo 1988.  The results  are
derived from the SWOPSIM model of the Economic Research Service  of
USDA.  The price changes simulate  the effect of free trade  in OECD
countries  in year 2000 compared with a reference  scenario in which
policies are held at  their 1984/85  levels.
(c)  International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium  (IATRC),
Assessing the Benefits of Trade Liberalization,  summary of symposium,
Annapolis, Maryland, August 1988.  The reported scenario  simulates  the
effects of elimination of existing agricultural policies  of OECD
countries,  using 1986 as  the base period.
(d)  Tyers, R.  and Anderson, K.,  Liberalising OECD agricultural policies  in
the Uruguay Round:  effects on trade and welfare, J.  of Agricultural
Economics, May 1988.
(e)  Parikh, K.  S.,  Fischer, G.,  Fronhberg, K.,  and Gulbrandsen, O.,
Towards Free Trade  in Agriculture.  International Institute  for
Applied Systems Analysis  (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria, 1986.
20academic economists  involved, has criticized the models for failing to
capture important dynamic issues  including retaliation and behavior under
risks, and for  their tendency to treat agriculture as  a small and separable
sector, justifying  "partial equilibrium" estimates of gains and losses.  In
addition, the models  tend to  aggregate many commodities as  if they were
homogenous products.
While possibly justified when modelling OECD grain markets,  these
assumptions  are far less  appropriate for developing countries.  Tyers
notes:
The perception that developing countries as  a group would be net
losers from any reform in the  industrial market economies  (as
suggested, for example, in Tyers  1989) has not only increased the
reticence of developing countries  to  support reforms  in the OECD,
it has also had institutional consequences  in that a formal
negotiating alliance has developed between net-food-importing
developing countries.  Yet a more detailed examination which
takes account of intersectoral and macroeconomic effects suggests
that a clear majority of developing countries could benefit from
such reforms  (Anderson and Tyers,  1990)  (emphasis added).19
19Rod Tyers,  "Searching Under the  Light:  The Neglect of General
Equilibrium, Dynamics and Risk in the Analysis of Food Trade Reforms."  A
lecture presented to  the Center for International Food and Agricultural
Policy, February 22,  1990, reprinted as  Staff Paper P90-66, Department of
Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, October, 1990.
R. Tyers,  "Developing Country Interests  in Agricultural Trade Reform,"
Agricultural  Economics 3(1989):  169-86.  K. Anderson and R. Tyers,  "How
Developing Countries Could Gain from Food Trade Liberalisation in  the
Uruguay Round."  Chapter 2 in I. Goldin and 0. Knudsen (eds.),  Agricultural
Trade Liberalization:  Implications for Developing Countries,  Paris, OECD.
1990.
21It  is useful  to  review briefly some of these estimates, beginning with
the recent work of Anderson and Tyers. 20 Utilizing stochastic
multicommodity, partial equilibrium models of world food markets,  they show
that  "virtually all developing countries could benefit  from global
liberalization of food markets and that the vast majority of the world's
poor would be better off."21 This  differs from their earlier findings  and
those of other authors, which predicted major losses,  especially to net
food  importing developing countries,  if global prices  rose following
liberalization.  What accounts  for this  difference  in view?  The  result
turns critically on how realistically the reform process  is  described.
Four elements are introduced in the Anderson and Tyers work  that
provides  greater realism.  First, while it  is  generally acknowledged that
rising world prices of agricultural commodities would cause unambiguous
improvements in the  terms of trade  in food exporting countries;  it  is  less
often emphasized that some net food importing countries would expand
production, and become net exporters over time.  Second, this production
expansion is  likely to be driven by induced innovations  in developing
countries' technology and institutions, following the dynamic pattern
predicted by Hayami and Ruttan.2 2 By shifting domestic  supplies out,
welfare gains can exceed the  losses  resulting from worsened terms of
20K. Anderson and R. Tyers, "Welfare Gains to Developing Countries
from Food Trade Liberalization Following the Uruguay Round," Department of
Economics and Centre for International Economic Studies, University of
Adelaide, Adelaide,  Australia, July, 1990.
21Ibid.,  p. 3.
22y. Hayami and V. W. Ruttan, Agricultural Development:  An
International Perspective,  Baltimore, MD:  The Johns Hopkins Press Ltd.,
1985.
22trade.  Third, if developing countries which have  insulated consumers by
subsidizing domestic food prices, encouraging import-dependency, instead
allowed world price increases  to be reflected domestically, the elimination
of these distortion could more than offset  the losses due to worsening
terms  of trade.  This effect  is amplified if induced innovations generate
the above-mentioned supply response and increased exports.  Fourth, even if
a country remained a net food importer and had no domestic food subsidies,
if it protected its non-food sector  (e.g.,  through overvalued exchange
rates)  then eliminating these non-food distortions would raise  the relative
price of food, with the  same effects possible as  in  the  first three cases
above.
In short, by acknowledging that increased output, induced innovations
leading  to higher productivity, and distortions in existing food and non-
food sectors characterize the dynamic process of adjustment to  trade
reform, a different picture emerges of its  impacts on food importing
countries.  Negative impacts are not certain a priori, and must be
determined empirically.
Empirical estimates of these impacts were made for two  scenarios:
complete  liberalization in just the North;  and liberalization  in both North
and South.  In both cases, productivity increases were first held constant,
then allowed to respond to increased prices.23  Food markets  included in
the model were grains, meats, dairy products and sugar, accounting for
about half of world food trade.  The estimates  for 1990 show what would
have occurred in equilibrium if distortions  in the North or in both North
23Anderson and Tyers,  1990, pp.  11-25.  These productivity increases
amount to  an outward shift in aggregate food supply.
23and South were eliminated.  The  effects  of subsidized food imports  in
developing countries were captured by lowering the relative internal  food
price consistent with the  1988  calculations of Krueger, Schiff and
Valdes.24
Table 2, row 1 shows that if the North liberalized alone,
international food prices would have risen in 1985 dollars by 24 percent
compared to  the  reference level.  Net economic welfare in developing
countries increases by $11 billion.  If productivity growth  is  induced in
response to  these price increases, prices  rise by 26 percent and net
economic welfare  in developing countries increases by $17  billion.  If both
the North and South liberalize,  the  effect on world food prices  is  a
negligible  -1 percent, since the actions have offsetting effects.  But
welfare  increases in developing countries are $28 billion assuming no
productivity response, and $33  billion with  it, about twice  the level that
occurs  if the North liberalizes alone.
24A. 0. Krueger, M. Schiff and A. Valdes, "Measuring the Impact of
Sector-specific and Economy-wide Policies on Agricultural Incentives in
LDCs."  World Bank Economic Review 2:2  (September, 1988):  255-72.
24Table  2.  Effects on International Food Prices and Economic Welfare of
Liberalizing Food Markets,  1990.
International  Change  in net economic welfare
food price  (1985 US$ billion per year)
change  (%)
Industrial  Developing  Global
Countries  Countries  Total
North:
Liberalization of industrial
country food policies with:
- exogenous productivity growth  24  40  11  50
- price-responsive prod. growth  26  47  17  62
North/South:
Liberalization of policies
affecting food markets in
industrial and developing
countries with:
- exogenous productivity growth  -1  62  28  90
- price-responsive prod. growth  -1  73  33  106
Note:  Economic welfare changes here apply only to  agents  in the food
sector, as measured by equivalent variations in  income of consumers
and changes  in producer surplus, in net government revenue from the
food sector and in net profits from food stock holding.  The global
total  includes  the (small) effect on net economic welfare  of Eastern
Europe and the USSR.
Source:  Anderson and Tyers,  1990, p. 22.
25Table 3.  Effects  of Completely Liberalizing Food Markets on Foreign Exchange Earnings
and Economic Welfare  in Individual Developing Countries Assuming Price-
Responsive Productivity Growth, 1990.
(1985 US$ billion per year)
North:  North/South:
Reform in industrial countries  Reform in  industrial and
only  developing countries
Change  in  Change  in  Change  in  Change  in  Change  in  Change  in
net  oreign  armr  econo  ne  foreign  farmers'  net  economic
exchan  e  earing  welfare  welfare  exchange  earnings  welfare  welfare
fron food  trade  from  food  trade
Bangladesh  0.2  0.7  -0.2  0.1  0.5  0.1
China  6.3  6.1  2.9  37.0  29.4  12.9
India  5.8  5.7  1.3  3.3  1.6  1.1
Indonesia  1.8  1.3  0.4  -1.3  -1.1  0.9
Korea, Rep.  0.0  0.4  -0.9  -6.8  -6.8  6.5
Pakistan  1.9  1.1  0.3  3.9  3.5  0.4
Philippines  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.3  -0.2  -0.1
Taiwan  0.1  0.4  -0.2  -1.7  -1.8  0.4
Thailand  1.0  0.6  0.5  -0.5  0.3  -0.2
Other Asia  1.8  1.4  0.5  15.3  7.5  1.7
SUB-TOTAL, Asia  20.0  17.8  4.6  49.0  32.9  23.7
Argentina  7.7  1.9  5.4  13.8  11.3  5.1
Brazil  7.9  3.8  2.9  7.8  5.8  0.8
Mexico  2.8  1.0  1.2  5.1  3.1  0.9
Other Latin America  6.4  2.3  3.2  8.6  7.4  0.8
SUB-TOTAL,  Latin  America  24.8  9.0  12.7  35.3  27.6  7.6
Egypt  0.0  0.2  -0.3  0.1  0.3  0.4
Nigeria  1.2  0.4  0.6  1.3  0.8  0.2
South  Africa  1.1  1.3  -0.7  -1.2  -0.5  -0.2
Other  Sub-Saharan Africa  3.9  1.3  2.0  12.2  7.5  2.3
Other  North  Africa  plus
Middle East  0.0  1.5  -2.3  0.8  1.3  -0.6
SUB-TOTAL, Africa+M.East  6.2  4.7  -0.7  13.2  9.4  2.1
TOTAL, Dev. Countries  51.0  31.5  16.6  97.5  69.9  33.4
TOTAL, Indust.Countries  -78.5  -87.0  46.5  -134.2  -160.9  73.3
WORLD TOTAL  -20.8  -44.4  62.2  -35.2  -87.5  106.4
Note:  Net welfare includes  the effects  on food consumers, taxpayers  and food stock-
holders  as well as  food producers.  Effects on expenditures to  administer and to
lobby for and against food policies, not included above, would add to  the net
welfare gains from reform.  The world total includes  effects on Eastern Europe
and the USSR.
Source:  Anderson  and  Tyers,  1990,  p.  23.
26Table 4.  Effects of Removing Policy Distortions to Food Markets  in Industrial and
Developing Countries on the  Instability of International Food Markets Prices.
Wheat  Coarse  Rice  Beef  and  Pork  end  Dairy  Sugar  Weighted




of variation  0.58  0.53  0.38  0.24  0.08  0.26  0.36  0.34
Coefficient of variation
in the absence of policy
distortions  in:
All industrial countries  0.33  0.47  0.28  0.07  0.08  0.11  0.25  0.23
All industrial and
developing countries  0.15  0.23  0.09  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.11
Note:  The coefficient of variation is  the  standard deviation divided by the mean value
for 100 repeated simulations with random supply shocks.
Source:  Anderson and Tyers,  1990, p. 24.
27The effect of  these gains  for different countries  is  detailed in the
first three columns of Table 3.  The welfare gains of North-only reform are
widely distributed, although  some developing countries  still experience
overall losses.  These are either relatively wealthy countries  (Korea,
South Africa, Taiwan and the Middle East) specialized in manufacturing  and
petroleum, or countries that are very heavily food-import dependent
(Bangladesh and Egypt).  However, no developing country is projected to
face an increased food import bill.
When a North/South liberalization is undertaken, shown in the  last
three  columns of Table  3, even fewer developing countries  lose.  In  the
South, farmers are  the main beneficiaries.  These policy changes not only
improve net welfare, they also reduce real  income  inequality by raising the
prices received by farmers and rural laborers.
A final dimension of these changes  is  shown in Table  4, which
estimates  the impacts of liberalization on the  stability of international
agricultural prices.  When either the North or  South insulate their
producers from international prices,  they in effect "export" domestic price
instability into the international economy.  This has been described as a
form of "free  riding,"  in which the international public good of price
stability is  eroded through protection by either producers or consumers. 2 5
Anderson and Tyers  calculated that if the North liberalized, variation in
international prices would be reduced by about one-third  (from a
coefficient of 0.34 to  0.23)  and that  if a North/South liberalization
25C.  Ford Runge, "International Public Goods, Export  Subsidies and the
Harmonization of Environmental Regulations."  Staff paper P90-77,  Center
for International Food and Agricultural Policy, Department of Agricultural
and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, U.S.A.,  December
1990.
28occurred, by about two-thirds  (from 0.34 to 0.11).
The implications of Anderson and Tyers' estimates are worth brief
development.  First, they suggest  that the losses due to  trade
liberalization predicted by net food importers such as  the  FIGs  group are
probably overestimates of the negative welfare  impacts of declining terms
of trade.  Conversely, earlier estimates of gains from trade policy reform,
such as  Tyers and Anderson's 1988 study, are probably underestimates.
Second, the results raise questions over claims  in favor of exemptions  for
distortionary policies  in developing countries based on special and
differential treatment, since eliminating (downward) distortions of  food
prices  in  the South actually increases  the welfare gains of liberalization
in a joint North/South action.  Third, the price stabilization effects of
trade policy reform suggest  the  somewhat unorthodox view that
liberalization may be a better mechanism to achieve such stability than
international  commodity agreements, which have often been justified as
stabilization programs.
The Anderson and Tyers study also undermines  arguments by apologists
for the international price-depressing (and destabilizing)  effects  of the
E.C.'s Common Agricultural Policy, who have asserted that such effects  are
beneficial  to importing countries.  The estimated negative effects of food
policies  on the economic welfare of developing countries  is  so  large  (as
much as  $17 billion in 1985 dollars) "as  to  effectively erode  about half of
the official development assistance  received by developing countries  from
the OECD." 26
26Anderson and Tyers,  1990, p. 16.
29Finally, the results have implications for the  impact of
liberalization  in Eastern Europe, where agricultural exports  are likely to
be an important source of  foreign exchange earnings  in new democracies.
Both Eastern Europe  and the rest of the  developing world would benefit from
trade  liberalization as  least as much as from expanded development
assistance.
A criticism applicable  to Anderson and Tyers model,  as well as
numerous other  studies of  trade reform,  is  that they estimate the  impact of
complete  liberalization rather than more  incremental  reforms.  This  "first
best" outcome is probably unrealistic.  A recent study conducted for the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) by the World
Institute  for Development Economics Research of the U.N. University in
Helsinki attempted to estimate  the  impacts of  less-than-full reforms.27
The UNCTAD study estimated the  impact  on developing countries  of four
different types of trade reform undertaken by the North  (Australia, Canada,
the  E.C.,  Japan and the United States).  Crop coverage  included both
cereals  (wheat, maize, rice, sorghum),  meat  (beef and veal),  sugar,
oilseeds and oils,  coffee and coffee products, cocoa, tea, tobacco  and
cotton.  While this commodity coverage is  larger than in the Anderson-
Tyers study, the methods employed are comparative static and partial
equilibrium.  Thus,  the estimates are  likely to overstate  damages  to net
importers.  However, the advantage of the UNCTAD model is  that  it allows
comparison of different types of trade  reform.
27UNCTAD,  "Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round:
Implications for Developing Countries."  UNDP/UNCTAD Projects of Technical
Assistance to Developing Countries for Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
UNCTAD/ITP/48.  New York, 1990.
30Four types  of trade reform were modeled, using 1984-86 as a base.
These were:
(1)  Complete liberalization,  including the elimination of all
producer and consumer subsidies, all  tariffs and quotas,  as well
as  internal taxes  on tropical products.
(2)  Reductions in producers price support by 20 percent.
(3)  Elimination of export subsidies.
(4)  An increase in imports by 10 percent in five markets for tropical
and other developing country products, either through increases
in quota or  reductions in tariffs.
Apart from scenario  (1),  which corresponds to an unlikely  "first best"
outcome, the remaining options correspond closely to  the elements  of the
Hellstrom compromise proposal discussed above.  Reform scenario  (2),
producer price support reductions of  20 percent, is  less than the 30
percent internal support cuts proposed by Hellstrom  (which were  calculated
on a 1990 base),  but still provides an indication of the effects  such cuts
would have on developing countries.  Reform  (3),  elimination of  export
subsidies,  is  greater than the 30 percent proposed by Hellstrom, and
corresponds to the Cairns Group's proposals, reflecting the  interests of
net exporting developing countries.  Reform (4),  increases  in market
access of 10 percent,  is  less than called for by Hellstrom, but  is  still
the most  important reform from the point of view of both net exporting and
importing developing countries.
The estimates  reported below examine each of the above  reforms in
isolation.  In reality, if a package of GATT reforms  is ultimately agreed
to,  it will be a blend of these actions,  in all  likelihood some combination
31of  (2),  (3) and  (4).  Even so,  the UNCTAD study results allow the relative
importance of the reform package components to be  studied in greater
detail.
Table 5 shows  the  impact of the  four reforms on world prices  for  the
commodities included in the study.  Rice prices rise dramatically under
reform scenarios  (1) and  (2),  while reform (3),  export subsidy elimination,
has  its  greatest  impact on wheat, beef and rice.  For  tropical products,
the greatest increases  in price occur under reform scenario  (4),  confirming
the  importance of even 10 percent  increases  in market access.
Table 6 shows  the regional results reported in the UNCTAD study,
indicating the gains and losses  in foreign exchange and welfare resulting
from the price increases estimated in Table 5.  It bears emphasis  that
unlike the Anderson and Tyers study, no dynamic adjustments in production
or induced shifts  from imports  to exports due to  price increases are
allowed for.  Even so,  the only developing region with net foreign exchange
losses  is Africa under either reform scenario  (1)  or  (2).  Under both
complete  liberalization and 20 percent reductions  in support, all other
regions of the South are net foreign exchange gainers.  Welfare changes
remain positive for Latin America and the Caribbean, but turn negative for
Africa, Asia and the Pacific.  Reform scenario  (3) gives the same
qualitative results.  Reform scenario  (4) is  again the most clearly
beneficial, resulting in the largest gains in foreign exchange and welfare
for all developing countries.  Table 7 shows  detailed results  for the
countries  in the UNCTAD study.
32Table  5.  Estimated Change  in World Prices of Agricultural Products
(Including Tropical Products) Under Alternative Liberalization
Scenarios
(Increase in per cent)
SCENARIO
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
20 percent  10 percent
Complete  reduction  Export  increase  in
Product  liberalization  in producer  subsidy  imports
support price
Wheat  20.4  7.5  12.2  1.1
Maize  15.1  4.8  0.1  3.9
Rice  42.6  18.3  8.5  2.2
Sorghum  12.4  1.9  0.0  2.4
Soya beans  3.6  0.0  0.0  2.5
Soyabean oil  1.9  0.1  0.0  0.0
Beef and veal  12.5  13.0  11.1  1.6
Sugar  26.5  10.6  0.9  4.3
Cotton  0.1  0.9  0.0  9.1
Groundnut  0.1  1.5  0.0  5.1
Goundnut oil  2.8  0.6  9.0  3.9
Copra  0.0  0.0  0.0  20.1
Palm oil  0.4  0.0  0.0  1.6
Tea  2.9  0.5  0.0  8.3
Coffee:
Green  4.4  0.4  0.0  29.9
Roasted  7.5  0.0  0.0  38.7
Extracts  7.8  1.4  0.0  1.3
Cocoa:
Beans  0.1  0.0  0.0  19.7
Butter  2.8  0.5  0.0  9.1
Powder  5.2  0.8  0.0  4.2
Chocolate,nes.  9.0  1.8  0.0  1.0
Tobacco:
Leaves  2.6  0.3  0.0  12.3
Cigarettes  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0
Cigars  3.2  0.8  0.0  0.1
N.e.s.  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.6
Source:  UNCTAD,  1990, p. xvi.
33Table 6.  ESTIMATED FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND WELFARE IMPACT ON DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES UNDER DIFFERENT SCENARIOS:  SUMMARY BY REGION.
(Millions of 1985-1987 dollars)
(1) Complete  liberalization (PSE and CSE reduced to  zero;  and tariffs, quotas
and internal  taxes eliminated on tropical products)
Selected
agricultural  Selected  All selected
products  tropical products  products
Region  For.ex.  Welfare  For.ex.  Welfare  For.ex.  Welfare
earnings  ch  change  earnings  change  earnings  change
Africa  -699  -953  219  143  -480  -810
Latin America
& Caribbean  984  224  562  445  1,546  669
Asia & Pacific  428  -483  141  77  589  -406
TOTAL  713  -1,212  922  665  1,635  -547
(2) Reduction of producer price support  (by 20 percent)
Selected
agricultural  Selected  All selected
products  tropical products  products
Regon  For.ex.  Welfare  For.ex.  Welfare  For.ex.  Welfare
earnings  change  earnings  change  earnings  change
Africa  -280  -402  32  21  -248  -381
Latin America
& Caribbean  456  152  71  31  527  203
Asia & Pacific  145  -225  18  1  163  -224
TOTAL  321  -473  121  73  447  -402
Source:  UNCTAD, 1990, p. xvii.
34Table  6.  (continued)
(Millions of 1985-1987 dollars)
(3) Elimination of export subsidies
Selected
agricultural  Selected  All selected
products  tropical products  products
Region  For.ex.  Welfare  For.ex.  Welfare  For.ex.  Welfare
earnings  change  earnings  change  earnings  change
Africa  -256  -359  0  0  -256  -359
Latin America
& Caribbean  262  37  0  0  262  37
Asia & Pacific  -89  -332  0  0  -89  -332
TOTAL  -83  -654  0  0  -83  -654
(4) Increase in imports by  10 percent
Selected
agricultural  Selected  All  selected
products  tropical products  products
Region  For.ex.  Welfare  For.ex.  Welfare  For.ex.  Welfare
earnings  change  earnings  change  earnings  change
Africa  -43  -67  1,926  1,337  1,881  1,270
Latin America
& Caribbean  192  87  3,446  2,769  3,638  2,856
Asia & Pacific  -19  -60  872  477  891  417
TOTAL  166  -40  6,244  4,583  6,410  4,543
Source:  UNCTAD, 1990, p. xvii.
35Table 7.  MAJOR GAINERS AND LOSERS a IN EACH COUNTRY GROUP  (ALL SELECTED
PRODUCTS)
(Millions of dollars)
(1)  Complete  (2)  20  percent  (3)  Export  (4)  10  percent
liberalization  reduction  subsidy in  increase
Country  group/  in producer  elimination  imports
Country  support  price
Revenue  Welfare  Revenue  Welfare  Revenue  Welfare  Revenue  Welfareb
POLICY  COUNTRIES
Australia  967  678  1,037  348  1,103  305  98
Canada  730  476  866  144  1,051  231  -158
EEC  -5,141  1,430  -2,246  455  -3,507  1,301  -3,912
Japan  -2,819  1,345  -503  559  -208  198  -1,135
United  States  4,411  2,829  294  849  704  6,161  -769
OTHER DEVELOPED
MARKET  ECONOMIES
Austria  36  6  21  8  23  11  -40  34
Finland  2  -12  5  0  4  0  -48  -33
New  Zealand  104  59  107  66  91  57  43  -4
Norway  -16  -27  -2  -6  -2  -4  -44  -30
Sweden  32  2  19  7  23  12  -29  -90
Switzerland  3  -24  -2  -11  -4  -9  -35  -78
EASTERN  EUROPE
Czechoslovakia  14  -20  13  -5  -13  0  -43  -62
German  Dem.  Rep.  -10  -36  2  -20  1  -14  -58  -32
Poland  -44  -103  -17  -42  -27  -30  -40  -67
USSR  -42  -1,049  -169  -436  -166  -402  -31  -210
CENTRAL  AMERICA
AND  MEXICO
El  Salvador  24  17  3  1  -1  -2  176  141
Costa  Rica  35  23  13  8  8  2  155  118
Gugtemala  36  28  11  8  4  5  183  138
Honduras  23  16  10  7  6  3  94  72
Nicaragua  13  9  8  8  4  2  66  44
Mexico  -8  -76  -11  -22  -5  14  331  251
CARIBBEAN
Cuba  128  68  47  22  -9  -20  62  45
Dom.  Republic  43  24  15  10  1  -1  73  55
aCountries  for which welfare changes by more  than $50  million under one  of the
four scenarios.
bWelfare calculations were not made for  the policy countries under the
scenario  of a 10 percent increase  in imports,  since  this cannot be  done
without specifying how the increase  in  imports  is  to be brought about.
Source:  UNCTAD, 1990, p. xxii.
36Table 7.  (continued)  (Millions of dollars)
(1)  Complete  (2)  20  percent  (3)  Export  (4)  10  percent
liberalization  reduction  subsidy  in  increase
Country  group/  in  producer  elimination  imports
Country  support  price
Revenue  Welfare  Revenue  Welfare  Revenue  Welfare  Revenue  Welfareb
SOUTH AMERICA
Argentina  670  438  259  171  231  149  118  66
Brazil  431  219  114  16  6  -43  1,521  1,125
Columbia  102  86  17  12  2  -3  597  546
Ecuador  10  3  0  -2  -2  -4  93  32
Peru  0  -29  -6  -16  -9  -13  65  36
Uruguay  90  39  68  47  54  37  6  3
Venezuela  -31  -59  -12  -23  -9  -16  8  1
SUB-SAHARAN  AFRICA
Cameroon  15  10  1  0  -1  2  165  131
Cote  d'Ivoire  41  6  -3  -13  -3  -12  239  408
Ethiopia  3  1  -1  -2  -3  -4  62  61
Ghana  -4  -8  -3  -4  -2  -3  99  80
Kenya  27  15  2  0  -2  -2  194  117
Madagascar  -7  -16  -6  -8  -3  -4  62  48
Magnuas  -73  -80  -21  -34  -2  -3
Nigeria  -87  -119  -39  -34  -29  -39  78  57
Uganda  33  19  3  1  0  0  252  132
United  Rep.  of  1  -4  -2  -3  -2  -2  64  60
Panzara  3  -4  -2  -4  -3  -4  -82  64
Zaire  24  16  6  3  2  1  83  65
Zimbabwe
NORTH AFRICA
Algiers  -01  -113  -33  -43  -37  -44  82  -93
Egypt  -172  -236  -69  -105  -82  -123  -16  -32
Morocco  -54  -68  -20  -25  -25  -32  -19  -24
WEST  ASIA
Iran  (Islam  -84  -167  -41  1  -1  -45  -63  -11  -19
Rep.  of)  -85  -135  -41  -69  -41  -59  -13  -24
Iraq  -76  -107  -37  -50  -20  -31  -24  -31
South  Arabia
SOUTH-EAST  ASIA
Bangladesh  -26  -32  -12  -22  -16  -26  3  -4
India  96  21  37  9  1  -18  194  138
Indonesia  0  -61  -18  -41  -18  -34  381  266
Malaysia  -13  -69  -13  -33  -8  -18  258  31
Myanmar  109  73  44  31  20  14  6  4
Pakistan  99  88  41  18  16  44  18
Philippines  61  20  21  4  -3  -11  52  33
Papua  New  Guinea  0  -3  -2  -5  -2  -3  66  53
Rep.  of  Korea  -96  -199  -44  -88  -29  -37  -37  -77
Thailand  688  478  267  188  100  70  87  18
*Countries  for which welfare changes by more than $50 million under one  of the
four scenarios.
bWelfare calculations were not made for the policy countries under the
scenario of a 10 percent  increase  in imports, since  this cannot be done
without specifying how the  increase  in imports  is  to be brought about.
Source:  UNCTAD, 1990, p. xxii.
37The overall  results of the UNCTAD study reinforce the conclusion that
market access  is by far the most important element of the negotiations  for
developing countries.  Taken in isolation, any of the  scenarios  (1),  (2) or
(3) provide fewer benefits  than  (4):  10  percent increases in market
access.  Indeed,  (1),  (2) and (3) actually impose  substantial losses  on
some parts of the developing world.  It  is possible  to  interpret  the UNCTAD
results  to  suggest that  (a) complete  liberalization is probably not in  the
interest of the  developing countries,  and (b)  without major increases  in
market access, preferably greater than 10 percent and closer  to  the  30
percent figure  in the Hellstrom compromise, a reform package including
elements  of  (2),  (3) and  (4)  will not be clearly advantageous  to  the  South.
If major market access gains are achieved, however, they are  likely to be
so  substantial as  to  outweigh other disadvantages.
A third major study, undertaken recently by the U.S.  Department of
Agriculture,28 offers another perspective on the impacts  of trade  reform.
Based on the U.S.D.A. Static World Policy Simulation Model  (SWOPSIM),
containing 36 regions and 22  commodities,  the  study reconfirms the price
increasing effects of liberalization,  but is both less  realistic and  less
detailed than the previous two models.  The  study excludes  important
tropical products  included in the UNCTAD work:  coffee, cocoa, and some
vegetables and fruits.  The model is  static and partial equilibrium in
nature.  Output increases due  to  increased prices following liberalization
are modeled as movements along the  supply curve,  rather  than as  dynamic
28B. Krissoff, J. Sullivan, J. Wainio and B. Johnston.  "Agricultural
Trade Liberalization and Developing Countries."  Economic Research Service.
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Staff Report No. AGES  9042, Washington,
D.C.  May 1990.
38outward shifts, in the manner of Anderson and Tyers.  Using 1986  as  a base
year, the model estimates what would have happened if trade distortions
were eliminated and all other variables remained the  same.  Three scenarios
are examined:
(1)  The North fully  liberalizes, while developing countries maintain
their own policies so  as  to  insulate  themselves  from one half of
the price increases  that result.  A $1.00  increase in world
prices thus affects  them by only $0.50.
(2)  The North fully liberalizes, and no  insulation occurs in the
developing countries,  so  that they fully absorb  the price
increases resulting from liberalization.  Hence a $1.00  increase
in world prices  increases prices  in developing countries by the
same amount.
(3)  A full North/South liberalization,  in which all  farm programs  are
eliminated in both developed and developing economies.
Thus,  scenario  (3) corresponds to a "first best"  (and unrealistic)
full liberalization exercise.  Scenarios  (1)  and  (2) are similar  to  those
examined by Anderson and Tyers, although dynamic production shifts are
given comparatively less  leeway in the SWOPSIM model.  Table 8 shows the
price effects by commodity for all  three  simulations.  Table 9 provides
summary data on supply and demand shifts, net trade,  and welfare changes by
country for each of  the  three scenarios.  Table 8 shows world price
increases of 21  percent under  the  first scenario, and 16 percent under the
second and third scenarios.  Overall,  the regional  impacts on net welfare,
shown in Table 9, vary widely by region, regardless of the scenario.
39Table  8.  World Price Changes in Each Simulation.
Commodity  (1)  (2)  (3)
Percent
Beef  19  16  11
Pork  14  12  11
Mutton and lamb  31  25  21
Poultry meat  18  16  16
Poultry eggs  6  5  4
Dairy milk  0  0  0
Dairy butter  99  84  85
Dairy cheese  43  37  38
Dairy products  88  81  81
Wheat  37  27  20
Corn  29  22  23
Coarse grains  22  16  15
Rice  19  11  15
Soybeans  -2  -2  -3
Soymeal  -4  -3  -5
Soyoil  5  4  8
Other oilseeds  12  8  8
Other meals  -1  1  2
Other oils  9  7  14
Cotton  12  8  4
Sugar  48  29  40
Tobacco  4  3  3
Average  21  16  16
Source:  USDA, 1990, p. 13.
40Table 9.  Industrial Market Liberalization,  Scenario  (1).
Change  in--  Change  in--
Area  Supply  Demand  Net  Producer Consumer  Net
quantity quantity  trade  surplus  surplus  welfare
-- Percent  --  ----------- $ Million-----------
United States  -1.5  -1.2  2,832  -15,974  -4,645  8,822
Canada  -2.1  -.4  703  -1,275  150  2,609
European Community  -5.6  2.8  -9,213  -23,466  21,510  12,059
Other Western Europe  -16.3  -1.1  -1,909  -7,146  2,184  1,293
Japan  -30.4  9.4  -6,212  -22,011  23,575  4,985
Australia  6.2  -3.6  3,151  1,543  -1,546  1,109
New Zealand  12.0  2.2  2,478  1,745  -837  1,354
South Africa  3.0  -1.6  442  503  -485  87
Eastern Europe  .7  -.4  1,738  2,378  -2,374  789
Soviet Union  .4  -.4  -588  3,507  -3,912  -1,790
China  .7  -.3  1,133  3,476  -3,570  -73
Mexico  2.6  -2.0  520  1,111  -1,304  -133
Central America/Caribbean  3.3  -1.6  664  496  -306  432
Brazil  1.9  -1.5  913  1,691  -1,943  -292
Argentina  3.2  -2.0  1,730  995  -851  656
Chile  2.1  -1.7  25  60  -67  -9
Venezuela  2.2  -1.1  91  229  -259  -39
Other Latin America  2.6  -1.8  334  632  -684  -69
Nigeria  2.5  -1.7  12  146  -220  -62
Kenya  4.5  -2.7  28  54  -57  -4
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  1.7  -1.5  264  666  -715  -47
Egypt  1.5  -1.6  -314  511  -801  -529
Middle East/North Africa--  2.6  -1.8  -1,971  649  -1,759  -2,291
oil producers
Middle East/North Africa--other  2.0  -.8  56  870  -1,032  -265
India  2.2  -2.2  2,647  4,486  -4,662  332
Pakistan  4.2  -1.9  498  528  -500  109
Bangladesh  4.4  -2.6  232  333  -359  -40
Indonesia  2.0  -1.5  302  755  -775  -84
Thailand  3.0  -.9  534  409  -245  334
Malayasia  .9  -1.3  157  100  -93  63
Philippines  1.5  -1.3  196  312  -322  10
South Korea  1.0  -.9  -254  281  -485  -439
Taiwan  1.1  -1.1  -52  212  -374  -254
Other East Asia  1.7  -1.6  -251  27  -171  -293
Other Asia  1.9  -1.2  211  705  -788  -117
Rest of world  .2  -5.8  -1,126  109  -817  -1,445
Developing country total  2.2  -1.8  5,445  16,367  -19,590  -4,476
Source:  USDA, 1990, p. 44.
41Table 9.  Industrial Market Liberalization,  Scenario  (2).
Change  in--  Change  in--
Area  Supply  Demand  Net  Producer Consumer  Net
quantity quantity  trade  surplus  surplus  welfare
-- Percent  --  -----------. Million-----------
United States  -2.5  -.7  191  -18,745  -1,768  8,928
Canada  -3.0  .3  154  -1,847  596  2,483
European Community  -6.3  3.3  -10,899  -26,986  25,571  12,600
Other Western Europe  -17.2  -.8  -2,058  -7,527  2,669  1,397
Japan  -31.5  9.9  -5,884  -22,295  24,598  5,724
Australia  4.2  -3.2  2,295  1,095  -1,369  838
New Zealand  9.9  1.9  2,041  1,457  -754  1,148
South Africa  5.0  -2.7  597  853  -802  19
Eastern Europe  .6  -.3  1,489  1,996  -1,978  691
Soviet Union  .3  -.3  -395  2,856  -3,164  -1,373
China  .5  -.3  879  2,563  -2,634  -69
Mexico  4.4  -3.2  1,110  1,868  -2,170  -59
Central America/Caribbean  4.6  -2.3  550  711  -461  250
Brazil  3.2  -2.2  1,580  2,769  -3,111  -431
Argentina  5.4  -3.2  2,334  1,727  -1,420  532
Chile  3.2  -2.5  45  93  -100  -7
Venezuela  3.9  -1.7  207  404  -431  -22
Other Latin America  4.2  -2.9  625  1,048  -1,107  -59
Nigeria  3.6  -2.3  87  214  -313  -28
Kenya  6.9  -3.9  47  83  -86  -3
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  2.5  -2.0  399  971  -1,033  -61
Egypt  2.4  -2.5  -44  847  -1,304  -442
Middle East/North Africa--  4.3  -2.9  -1,144  1,084  -3,048  -1,964
oil producers
Middle East/North Africa--other  3.1  -1.2  301  1,386  -1,606  -220
India  3.2  -3.1  3,696  6,964  -6,931  335
Pakistan  6.0  -2.6  608  784  -734  50
Bangladesh  5.3  -3.2  295  405  -445  -40
Indonesia  2.5  -1.9  390  961  -984  -105
Thailand  4.1  -1.3  458  546  -323  195
Malayasia  1.1  -1.7  151  144  -128  12
Philippines  2.2  -1.9  254  454  -466  -27
South Korea  1.5  -1.3  -94  408  -713  -385
Taiwan  1.9  -1.6  68  329  -575  -273
Other East Asia  3.1  -2.5  -145  47  -272  -225
Other Asia  2.4  -1.4  314  907  -1,019  -112
Rest of world  .3  -9.4  -502  218  -1,382  -1,164
Developing country total  3.3  -2.6  11,591  25,374  -30,160  -4,251
Source:  USDA, 1990, p. 45.
42Table 9.  Industrial Market Liberalization,  Scenario  (3).
Change  in--  Change  in--
Area  Supply  Demand  Net  Producer Consumer  Net
quantity quantity  trade  surplus  surplus  welfare
-- Percent  --  -----------S Million----------
United States  -3.0  -.5  -1,207  -19,886  -771  8,784
Canada  -3.3  .7  -103  -2,047  721  2,409
European Community  -6.6  3.4  -11,196  -27,288  26,126  12,853
Other Western Europe  -17.4  -.6  -2,099  -7,564  2,707  1,397
Japan  -31.1  10.1  -5,810  -22,103  24,414  5,732
Australia  3.6  -2.9  1,954  985  -1,329  768
New Zealand  9.4  2.0  1,921  1,426  -750  1,122
South Africa  1.5  -2.0  368  228  -623  152
Eastern Europe  .6  -.3  1,493  1,924  -1,892  729
Soviet Union  .3  -.3  -461  2,649  -2,947  -1,341
China  .5  -.3  856  2,587  -2,656  -76
Mexico  2.2  -5.0  1,843  2,298  -3,337  505
Central America/Caribbean  5.3  -2.4  740  860  -465  394
Brazil  -1.7  -2.0  1,062  -1,008  -2,930  406
Argentina  9.8  -6.6  4,601  3,626  -2,744  637
Chile  2.8  -2.5  40  87  -95  -9
Venezuela  9.7  4.1  457  158  393  400
Other Latin America  3.7  -2.7  555  983  -1,052  -69
Nigeria  4.1  -3.2  137  263  -543  24
Kenya  7.0  -4.1  45  89  -95  -6
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  3.3  -1.6  416  1,090  -1,138  -48
Egypt  -6.1  -1.4  -84  313  -1,201  -181
Middle East/North Africa--  3.9  -2.8  -1,212  989  -2,975  -1,986
oil producers
Middle East/North Africa--other  2.9  -.9  220  1,229  -1,454  -225
India  2.2  -2.5  4,246  7,420  -4,139  1,746
Pakistan  16.6  -2.2  1,323  1,702  -827  317
Bangladesh  7.0  -4.1  417  549  -573  -24
Indonesia  -.1  2.2  -157  -38  895  119
Thailand  .6  -.4  443  158  -235  346
Malayasia  -3.3  -.4  328  425  38  130
Philippines  -.8  .7  71  -30  127  67
South Korea  -19.4  18.9  -954  -3,423  7,084  1,490
Taiwan  -1.8  3.3  -115  -268  530  -58
Other East Asia  3.1  -2.4  -139  46  -263  -217
Other Asia  3.3  -1.8  464  1,153  -1,232  -79
Rest of world  .2  -8.8  -463  226  -1,309  -1,083
Developing country total  1.3  -1.1  14,283  18,896  -17,538  2,597
Source:  USDA, 1990, p. 46.
43The main conclusions are that  it  is clearly in the developing countries'
interest to participate in  the process  of trade  reform, if  the  industrial
countries pursue such a course.  Second, it would appear that Latin
America will benefit most as  region from joint North/South liberalization
(consistent with the  UNCTAD study) and that developing countries as  a whole
will benefit more than they will  lose,  at least from scenario  (3).  Since
this  scenario is  the  least realistic, however, it  is notable that  if  the
North liberalizes  and the  South does not,  it suffers a net loss  in welfare
whether  it allows  higher prices  to be partially [scenario  (1)]  or fully
[scenario  (2)]  transmitted.
What general conclusions can be extracted from these  estimates  of the
impact on developing countries of  trade policy reform?  While
interpretations may differ,  four general conclusions  emerge from  the
estimates above.  First, although the process  of trade reform is  likely  to
be incremental,  to  the  extent that developing countries participate  in
reforming their own food sectors  in tandem with countries  of the  North,
their benefits will substantially exceed a situation  in which they attempt
to  insulate their economies  from this process.  Indeed, attempts  to  do so
may actually cause  the South  to  lose both foreign exchange and welfare
benefits as world prices rise.  Second, of the  three key elements of  the
negotiation  in GATT:  export subsidies,  internal  support and market access,
the  greater the  gains  that  can be  achieved in  the market access  area,  the
more benefits will accrue to  the  South.  Third, the negative effects to  net
food importing countries attributed to rising food prices after  trade
44reform are probably overstated.  If Anderson and Tyers'  findings are valid,
the majority of  food importers may actually gain in welfare  terms,  if  these
price signals are  transmitted and food production expands.  Finally, and
ironically, the emphasis that many developing countries have placed on
special and differential treatment,  if used to justify  the continued
insulation of their agriculture from world market signals, may actually
deny them many of the benefits  of liberalization.
5.  The Elements  of an Agricultural Compromise
Given the opportunities for developing countries in  the Uruguay Round,
what kind of compromise  is  likely, and how could benefits  to  the South be
maximized?  In general,  it would appear that the Hellstrom compromise
proposal will serve  as  a general basis  for further discussions.  Whether 30
percent will be  the  exact amount of change agreed to in each of  the  three
areas of export subsidies,  internal supports  and market access  is unlikely.
Questions also  remain concerning the  role of "tariffication"  -- converting
quotas and other non-tariff barrier to  tariffs  -- as  a means  of assuring
market access.  Moreover, there  is  general displeasure with the proposed
base year of 1990, suggesting  that the U.S.-proposed base  of 1986-88 might
be chosen instead.
On balance, the  interests of developing countries appear best served
by  these three elements  in the negotiation, in descending order of
priority.
(1) Maximum gains  in access  to  industrial country markets,
particularly  in key commodities  such as  sugar,  tropical products  and  fruits
and vegetables.  Here  the sanitary and phytosanitary discussion will also
prove critical, since health, safety and environmental  standards appear to
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imports  (see Section 6).  If a true  30  percent increase  in market access
were guaranteed on a base  of 1986-88,  it would constitute a major victory
for developing countries  in the Uruguay Round.
(2) Maximum reductions  in export subsidies.  The gains  to exporting
developing countries such as Argentina and Brazil  from a cessation of
North/North export subsidy wars would be  substantial.  Coupled with  (1)
above, any negative terms-of-trade effects from increased prices  in food
importing countries could be largely offset by expanding export
opportunities.  If a 30  percent reduction in export subsidies were chosen
on a 1986-88 base,  it would provide substantial benefits  to agricultural
exporters, although even greater cuts,  of 40  or 50 percent, would be
preferable.
(3) Appropriate policy adjustments allowing transmission of  increased
prices  to  developing country domestic markets.  While selective and
continuing application of special and differential treatment will continue
to be necessary in most developing countries,  in order to  share in  the
benefits of liberalization the  South must be prepared to  pass along the
gains from higher food prices to farmers,  creating incentives  for expanded
output and, ultimately, lower levels  of import dependency.  Special and
differential treatment, or foreign exchange and balance of payments
problems associated with debt service, can become excuses  for inaction in
domestic policy.  The critique  that asserts liberalization as  a cause  of
growing gaps between the  industrial North and agrarian South can be  self-
fulfilling:  by insulating developing country economies  from global
markets, adjustments are put off that, once made, can allow the  South to
46share  in opportunities for growth.
This does not imply that expanded development aid, debt relief, and
other measures of technical and development assistance  do not complement
the process  of trade reform.  Indeed, to  the extent that these measures
help to  stimulate  the dynamic production response  associated with higher
food prices,  they are a  very significant part of the achievement of maximum
benefits from trade reform.
If a compromise proposal  in agriculture is  achieved, it must of  course
be linked to  agreements in  other critical areas such as  tropical products,
services, intellectual  property and textiles.  However, the better the
bargain achieved in agriculture,  the easier  it  will be  to  finalize
agreements  in these other areas.  The  final outcome of the Uruguay Round
will not likely occur until later in 1991,  and perhaps even 1992.  If  it
includes  the above elements  in agriculture,  it can provide a  basis  for
renewed growth in developing country economies.
6.  Prospects for the  1990s
The condition of agriculture  in the developing countries  in  the  1990s
will depend critically on three interrelated factors that have  formed the
basis for much of the  discussion above.  The  first is the willingness and
capacity of developing countries to  invest  in their own agricultural
sectors and to accelerate the process  of domestic policy reforms  giving
farmers positive  incentives  to produce.  These  investments  include both
direct expenditures on price  and incomes policies reversing  implicit  and
explicit taxation of agriculture, as well  as  indirect  expenditures
committed to longer  term projects of research, education and training.
Whereas many studies of agricultural development focus on constraints  to
47growth in the  South, and the  consequent need for outside actions  to
alleviate them, the primary mechanism of agricultural development  is  the
internal commitment to  invest in both technology and human capital.
Naturally, the means to  these ends  involve scarce resources,  not
readily available to many developing countries.  Thus, the  second factor
determining agricultural prospects will be  the willingness of the
industrial  economies of  the North to provide relief from much of  the  debt
imposed on developing countries during  the  1970s and 1980s,  and access to
greater development assistance.  The sooner this  debt can be written down,
or  off,  the sooner developing economies will rebound  to  levels  of growth
consistent with  increasing imports from exporters  in  the  North.
Development assistance will not be  readily available until budget deficits
in the North are  squarely faced.  Thus, both the private  and  the public
sector in the industrial  economies must  confront  the  failures of previous
debt-finance.
This effort  is unlikely to succeed without concerted international
efforts  to  coordinate the  actions of the multilateral agencies,
specifically the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the GATT.  In
the postwar period, these three  institutions were envisioned as  a three-
legged basis for economic and financial stability.  It  was  the
unwillingness of the U.S. Congress  to endorse  the larger International
Trade Organization  (ITO) which led to  the weaker rules of the  GATT. 29
Today the U.S. and other OECD countries must, as  a matter of
29See John H. Jackson,  World Trade and the Law of GATT (A Legal
Analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade),  Indianapolis:  The
Bobbs-Merrill  Co.,  Inc.,  1969;  and John H. Jackson, The World Trading
System:  Law and Policy of International Economic  Relations, Cambridge:
The MIT Press,  1989.
48enlightened self-interest, be prepared to  reinvigorate  the  role of
multilateral  institutions if coordinated debt relief  is  to  accompany the
broadening of international  trade  rules, complemented by development
assistance  targeted to  expanded agricultural productivity.  In the  Uruguay
Round, some progress in this  direction has occurred in the  Functioning of
the GATT System  (FOGS) negotiations, which have structured new
collaborative relationships between the  IMF, World Bank and GATT.  But
national governments need to bolster these  agreements, and relate  them to
the multilateral activities  of the U.N. and  its agencies.  And since  the
FOGS  is  only one of  15 negotiating areas,  all of which must reach agreement
for a final package,  achieving these  gains depends in  turn on resolving
disputs over agriculture  and the  other "problem areas"  of the Uruguay
Round.
The third factor determining the condition of agriculture in the  1990s
is  the one which the Uruguay Round itself has  some power to affect:  the
level of prices in world markets, and the access which developing countries
have to markets  in the North.  As suggested by the empirical  studies
examined above, market access and reductions  in subsidized export
competition will create the  demand conditions necessary for  farmers  to
respond by raising the productivity of developing country agriculture.
Between these forces of  demand and supply, international debt relief and
development assistance will serve to provide the necessary liquidity to
assure an exchange.
Yet these three factors will be  difficult to bring  into play, in part
because any one of them depends on the  others for success.  If developing
countries open their economies  and reduce their distortions, without debt
49relief, development assistance, and market access,  little will be  achieved.
If debt relief and development assistance are unrelated to  internal  reforms
and expanded market opportunities,  the dynamic growth opportunities  they
create are likely  to be unrealized.  If market access  is  granted, but
production does not respond to  increased demands due to  continuing
distortions  that tax farmers and subsidize consumers,  or debt-service that
bleeds economies of investment capacity, then it will be an opportunity
wasted.  Thus  the factors on which expanded agricultural growth depends
cannot occur  singly, but must occur jointly.
Even if they do,  there  are reasons  to expect that protectionism will
reappear  in other guises to  frustrate efforts by developing countries  to
gain access  to markets  in  the North.  In the  1990s, perhaps  the most
important is  the growing use  of environmental, health and safety  (EHS)
standards in developed countries  as nontariff trade barriers.  This  problem
is not new, but presents  itself with new force  in the  1990s.  In part this
is because of the growing constituency favoring "eco-protectionism,"  a
group fearful of food contaminated by chemical residues, meat tainted by
hormones, and products manufactured in any manner defined as
"environmentally unsound."  While the sanitary and phytosanitary
negotiations  in GATT have considered a subset of these issues, notably the
food and kindred products covered by FAO's Codex Alimentarius,  the  issues
extend beyond food and agriculture to  include almost any traded goods
affected by EHS  standards.30
30See C. Ford Runge, "Trade Protectionism and Environmental
Regulations:  The New Nontariff Barriers,"  Northwestern Journal of
International Law and Business, Northwestern University School of Law,
11(1):  47-61, Spring 1990.
50Because EHS standards have a growing national constituency, they are
especially attractive candidates  for disguised protectionism.
International distinctions  in the  tolerable  level of environmental  risks
are created because the weight attached to  environmental standards  tends  to
vary with the  income levels  of different countries.  Incentives  are created
to move restricted product and processes  into areas of lax regulation,
notably developing countries,  while denying  import access  to  countries  that
may not subscribe to  the  regulatory policies of the developed countries.
Without multilateral action, environmental standards become  sources of
trade tension.
Indeed, there has been longstanding recognition of the possibility for
conflicts between national environmental policy and more liberal
international trade.  The GATT articles explicitly recognize the
possibility that domestic health, safety, and environmental policies might
override  general attempts to lower trade barriers. 31 GATT Article XI
headed "General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions,"  states  in
paragraph (1):
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties,  taxes  or
other charges, whether made effective through quotas,  import or
export licenses or other measures, shall be  instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any
product of the territory of any contracting party or on the
exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party.
31Jackson,  op.  cit.,  note  29.
51Yet Article XX, headed "General Exceptions,"  provides
... nothing in the  Agreement shall be  construed to  prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
...(g) relating to  the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective  in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption;  provided that
such measures:
... are not applied in a manner which would constitute  a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the  same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international  trade.
A similar  set of exceptions  is  applied to health related measures
under Article XX(b).  GATT law emphasizes  that any restrictions imposed on
foreign practices for environmental or health reasons must also reflect a
domestic commitment, so  that the  exception cannot be misused as a
disguised form of protection.
The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations promulgated a
"Standards Code"  that has tried (also largely without success)  to  grapple
with the balance between health, safety, and environmental standards  and
trade  liberalization. 32 This  1979 code supplemented the GATT rules  that
require  "national treatment"  (no less  favorable  to  importers than to
domestic parties) and prohibit the  "nullification or  impairment" of trade
concessions through  the back-door device of nontariff barriers. 33 One
32Code of Conduct for Preventing Technical Barriers  to Trade, GATT,
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Doc. MTN/NTM/W1192/Rev.  5, cited in Rubin
and Graham, 1982.
33Jackson, op.  cit.,  note  29.
52purpose of the  Code was  to prevent  any product, technical, health, safety
or environmental standard from creating "unnecessary obstacles to
international trade. "34
Despite an additional  decade of discussions, including substantial
attention to both  technical standards and nontariff barriers  in  the Uruguay
Round, it  is  still unclear when and where such standards  constitute an
"unnecessary obstacle  to  international trade."  If anything, the temptation
to  use environmental and health standards  to deny access  to  home markets is
stronger now than in the  1980s.  As  the  European Community moves towards
its goal of market integration in 1992,  it will have strong incentives to
create common regulations  for internal purposes, but to  impose  restrictions
vis-a-vis the rest of the world.  A similar propensity may occur as  a
result of harmonization under the United States/Canada free trade
agreement.  However, even if national standards can be harmonized there  is
every reason to expect subnational jurisdictions  to utilize various health
and environmental standards  to protect certain markets.
Underlying the development of  these  trade  tensions are fundamental
differences in the views of developed and developing countries concerning
the appropriate level and extent of environmental health and safety
regulation.  Differences  in the domestic policy response to  these problems
are well represented in the  food systems of the North and South.  In  the
developed countries of North America and Western Europe,  the  "food problem"
arises not from too  little  food and land in production, but generally too
much.  As predicted by Engels' Law, the  incomes of developed countries have
34S.  J. Rubin and T. R. Graham  (eds.).  Environment and Trade.
Totowa, NJ:  Allanheld, Osmun Publishers, 1982, p. 8.
53increased, and the share of this  income  spent on food has fallen in
proportion to  other goods  and services.  This  characteristic makes  food an
"inferior good" in economics jargon.  In contrast, environmental quality
and health concerns have grown  in importance with  increasing income  levels.
They are what economists call  "superior goods,"  in the sense  that they play
a larger role  in the national budget as  national incomes  increase.3 5
In low-income developing countries, while the share of national
resources devoted to  food and agriculture remains large,  environmental
quality  and occupational health risks are widely perceived as  concerns of
the  rich.  Even if environmental and health risks are  acknowledged, the
income  levels  of most developing countries do not permit a structure of
environmental regulation comparable to  that in the North.  This  two-tiered
structure of international environmental regulation, with stricter
regulatory regimes  in developed countries paired with lax or non-existent
regulations  in developing countries,  increases the North-South flow of
environmental risks.  A kind of "environmental arbitrage"  results, in which
profits  are gained by exploiting the differential in regulations.  This
environmental arbitrage results from conscious policy choices that reveal
differences  in the value attached to  environmental quality by rich and poor
countries.  As  these paths of institutional innovation increasingly
diverge, so will the differential  impact of environmental constraints  on
producers in the North and competitors  in the South such  as Argentina and
35C. Ford Runge, "Induced Agricultural Innovation and Environmental
Quality:  The Case of Groundwater Regulation,"  Land Economics  (1987):  249-
58.
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The competitiveness implications of these trends  are not lost on
Northern producers.  They have been quick to see  the  trade relevance  of
environmental and health standards.  Growing consumer concerns with the
health and environmental impacts of agriculture create a natural  (and much
larger) constituency for nontariff barriers  to trade, justified in the  name
of health and safety.  As between countries in the North, obvious
differences in values also exist, although the regulatory gap  is  less
yawning.
Given the tension separating North and South, and the  lesser
differences between countries  in the  North, it would appear that a single
set of  standards is  unlikely to be successful.  The  Subsidies  Code adopted
during the Tokyo Round is  at least a necessary starting point, but some
mechanism must be  found to accommodate differences  in national priorities
linked  to levels  of economic development and cultural factors.
In view of differences  in levels  of economic development and national
priorities, it  is clear  that standards cannot be wholly uniform.  Jeffrey
James, in The Economics of New Technology in Developing Countries, 37
suggests  that despite valid arguments for improved health and environmental
regulations in the South,  "it does not follow from  this  that countries of
the Third World should adopt either the  same number or the  same level of
36C. Ford Runge, James  P. Houck, Daniel W. Halback,  "Implications of
Environmental Regulations for Competitiveness  in Agricultural Trade,"
Chapter 4 in John D. Sutton  (ed.),  Agricultural Trade and Natural
Resources:  Discovering the Critical Linkages, Boulder and London:  Lynne
Reinner Publishers,  1988.
37J. James, The Economics of New Technology in Developing Countries,
(Stewart and James, eds.),  1982.
55standards as developed countries."  James suggests  what may be called
intermediate standards,  "in  the  same sense and for  the  same basic reason as
that which underlies  the widespread advocacy of intermediate technology in
the Third World."  This does not imply a "downgrading" of developed country
regulations, but an "upgrading"  of developing countries' norms, together
with the recognition that the social costs of regulation are relative to
national income.
Unfortunately, despite recent attempts to  deal with these  issues  in
forums such as  GATT,  the  linkages from environmental regulation to
international trade have not been clearly recognized.  The  Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has worked to  develop
comprehensive rules affecting food and agriculture in the  Codex
Alimentarius.
38 A special technical working group at the GATT Secretariat
in Geneva is  attempting to  use this  code as  the basis  for harmonizing
member countries' regulations.  But there are no  agreed-upon standards
except for a few items, and none are regarded as binding in law.  With the
exception of the beleaguered GATT working group,  the  issue has not been
given priority by international institutions.
Beyond environmental considerations are shorter term problems of  trade
distortion and market access.  These distortions  threaten more  liberal
international  trade in ways  that are damaging to both developed and
developing country interests.  In addition to the development of carefully
reasoned legal arguments determining when environmental and health
standards are  in fact  trade barriers, an international accord on
38Food and Agriculture Organization, "Introducing Codex Alimentarius,"
FAO/WHO Food Standards Program, Rome,  1987.
56environmental and health regulations would be appropriate.  Similar in
nature to  the  1988 Montreal Protocol agreed to by 40 nations  to  reduce
emissions shown harmful to  the ozone  layer, its purpose would be  to  call
for the  rights, duties, and liabilities  that define national  regulations on
environment and health which can then be brought more nearly into accord.
In the absence of such an agreement, groups within nations will continue  to
advocate  the use  of regulations  as  disguised protectionism,  or  loosening
standards of environmental quality  in the name of greater competitiveness.
7.  Summary  and Conclusions
This chapter has surveyed the developments  in agricultural trade
leading to  the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  It has
analyzed the potential impact of the  trade  talks, and has considered some
important future issues  in agricultural trade.  The Uruguay  round has  been
the most ambitious  effort since  the establishment of GATT  in 1947  to
confront the distortions  in world agriculture.  This effort was driven by a
constellation of forces  in  the  1980s which together caused agriculture to
become too important to  ignore.  These  included mounting debt and economic
recession, leading  to  falling demand in developing countries  for developed
country exports, and consequent attempts  in the  North to  dump unsalable
surpluses  into international markets  at subsidized prices.  In the South,
falling GDP per capita reduced imports and was reflected in declining
exports  to  industrial economies  in the North.  As global  economic activity
slowed, the U.S.,  E.C. and Japan continued to protect and subsidize  their
agricultural sectors, leading to  substantial increases in rates of
protection between 1965 and 1983.  This protection insulated farmers  in the
North from the consequences of excess production, and "exported"
57instability as  well as  lowered prices  in international markets.  This
instability and price reduction penalized developing countries, who were
even less able  to pay accumulated debts.  But  the  gap between supported
domestic prices  in the North and depressed world prices  also raised the
costs of developed country policies, which reached all time highs  in  the
mid-1980s.  These costs were  the primary reason that the North came  to  the
bargaining table in GATT.
The Uruguay Round was initiated in December, 1986, with a major focus
on agricultural trade reform.  Previous  attempts  to discipline agricultural
trade in the Kennedy Round (1963-67)  and Tokyo Round  (1973-79) had met with
very limited success.  The Tokyo Round had established a variety of codes
that were amended to  the GATT articles,  and special and differential
treatment for developing countries was  given full expression as part of
GATT law.  But real progress in bringing agriculture under GATT rules and
disciplines had yet to be made.
During four years of negotiations, the primary differences in the
Uruguay round continued between the U.S. and E.C.,  although the Cairns
Group sided in large part with the U.S. at  least concerning E.G.  export
subsidies.  However, the U.S. was  also guilty of  such subsidies, as  well as
barriers  to market access  for developing country imports.  Three main
divisions  thus characterized the negotiation.  The first was a North/North
schism, primarily between the U.S.  and E.C.  The second was a North/South
divide, largely over market access and export subsidies.  The third was a
South/South division, defined by differences  in the interests of net
agricultural exporters  (who were  largely members of or allied with the
Cairns Group) and net agricultural importers  (represented by the Food
58Importing Group - FIGs).
The South/South divide was  linked in turn to  debt servicing questions.
For net exporters, higher world prices following liberalization would
assist in debt repayment.  But for net  importers,  the  opposite was  true.
As prices rose,  it appeared to  further weaken the capacity of food
importers  to  service their debts by raising their foreign exchange
obligations  for the purchase  of food.  This view was supported by a variety
of early quantitative studies  of the impacts of trade  liberalization.
Yet later studies began to  question this  reasoning.  While almost  all
modeling efforts examining the  impacts of trade reform concluded that world
prices would rise, with positive effects on net food exporters, the
consequences for net importers were  less clear a priori.  If rising prices
triggered increased output  through a process of induced technical and
institutional change,  imports would fall,  leading some countries  to  switch
from being net importers  to net exporters.  If such outward shifts  in
supply were matched by domestic policies  that allowed world price  increases
to be fully transmitted to  farmers,  the incentives  to  raise output would be
reinforced.  Under these  (more realistic) conditions,  the positive  foreign
exchange and welfare impacts of liberalization are  likely to reduce and in
many cases overcome  the negative terms of trade effects of increased
prices.
This  is ultimately an empirical issue.  Anderson and Tyers provide
estimates  of these effects which reinforce the argument  that losses  to  food
importers following liberalization are probably overestimates.  Their 1990
results also raise  questions over the wisdom of using special and
differential treatment  to continue justifying policies  that insulate
59developing country consumers from food price increases.  They also  imply
that liberalization would better serve global commodity price  stabilization
than continued reliance on commodity agreements.  Finally, the Anderson and
Tyers study undermines arguments  that the price depressing  (and
destabilizing) effects of the E.C.'s Common Agricultural  Policy are
actually beneficial to  food importers.
A second empirical  study was conducted in 1990 by the World Institute
for Development Economics Research for UNCTAD.  This study allowed
measurement of the  separate impacts on developing countries of 20 percent
reductions  in internal supports, export subsidy removal, and 10 percent
increases in market access.  This  study also considered the  impacts  of
complete  liberalization,  although changes are likely to be incremental.
The results  indicate that market access gains  are by far  the most
significant from the point of view of developing countries, and that if
substantial, they would tend to  dominate any  losses resulting from other
parts of a final negotiated package.
A third study, undertaken by the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
reconfirms the  price increasing effects of liberalization.  Three scenarios
are analyzed.  The first  involves full  liberalization by the industrialized
North, but only partial  (50 percent) transmission of price increases  to  the
developing countries of the South.  The second involves  full liberalization
in the North, and complete  transmission of price  increases to  the South.
The third involves  full North/South liberalization.  The study reconfirms
that price increases will benefit developing countries  in total,  and that
these benefits will be maximized if  the South liberalizes  in tandem with
the North.
60Overall,  the three studies suggest  that although the process  of  trade
reform is  likely to be  incremental,  it  is better  that North and South
liberalize jointly rather than separately.  Second, of the three elements
likely to form a final package  in agriculture:  export subsidies,  internal
support and market access,  it  is  the third which emerges as  of overriding
importance to  developing countries.  Third, the negative effects  to net
food importing countries due  to price  increases  following trade reform are
probably overstated.  Fourth, an emphasis or special and differential
treatment should not be used to justify continued insulation of developing
countries  from price increases,  or  it will deny them many of the  resulting
benefits.
Given these results, the elements of an agricultural compromise  in
GATT must include specific attention to  three main factors.  The first and
most important is maximum gains in access  to  industrial country markets,
including assurances  in the sanitary and phytosanitary negotiations that
environment, health and safety standards will not become barriers to  trade.
The second is maximum reductions in export  subsidies, allowing net
exporters  to increase  their foreign exchange earnings.  The third is
appropriate policy adjustments allowing transmission of  increased world
prices  to developing country farmers,  creating incentives  to  expand output.
Prospects  for agricultural trade  in the  1990s will depend on whether
both developed and developing countries can muster the will to  undertake
three  types of reform.  First, developing countries must be prepared to
invest in their own farmers'  agricultural development, both directly in
terms of price and income supports,  and indirectly in terms of research,
extension and training.  Second, developed countries need to help make
61these  investments affordable by reducing the debt  load of the South,  as
well as  confronting their own debts and deficits.  Third is  the Uruguay
Round, and the package of reforms outlined above,  which can expand market
areas and export opportunities for  the South, creating new demands for
increased production.
Yet even if these reforms  are taken, threats  to  the  international
trading system in agriculture will remain.  Perhaps the most  important, in
the years following the Uruguay Round, will be  environmental, health, and
safety standards functioning as disguised barriers to  trade.  Only
concerted efforts by the multilateral  agencies of the U.N.,  the GATT and
national  governments will prevent these  from becoming the nontariff
barriers of choice  in the  1990s.
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